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Understanding Patenting Decisions: A Classroom Experiment
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 11/23/07
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$87.64
117.70
105.73
141.76
61.49
57.72
66.51
     *
252.36
$92.27
117.62
114.29
143.66
55.14
48.73
60.40
       *
264.88
$94.91
120.35
113.71
147.63
49.02
48.22
58.15
90.50
264.70
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.74
3.44
6.56
5.57
2.71
7.58
3.43
9.22
6.41
       *
7.80
3.77
10.31
6.79
2.72
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . .
135.00
87.50
82.50
155.00
97.50
       *
135.00
87.50
         *
* No market.
Innovations are crucial to the future success of firms, with
most products having only a limited life cycle. When
innovations occur, the firm must decide the best way to protect
their intellectual property; this essentially comes down to
keeping the innovation a trade secret or filing for a patent.
Teaching students the basics of intellectual property protection
is not difficult. Most are familiar with the general concept of
patent protection and have some understanding as to why
patents are an important tool available to firms and individual
innovators. However, an in-depth analysis of the patenting
decision making process can be less straightforward. There are
several major decisions firms or innovators face that students
must contemplate. Among the key ones are:
• When should an innovator select to patent instead of using
trade secrecy?
• What are the differences between narrow and broad
patents, and what are the factors affecting the innovator’s
patent breadth decision?
• What is the best response if a patent is infringed: invoke
a trial, accommodate entry, or license the innovation? 
Understanding the implications and risks that go into a
firm’s patenting decisions and the interdependence that exists
between these decisions can give students a more complete
understanding of the patenting process. Through the
determination of the optimal patenting decisions, students can
learn how patents affect the ability of innovators to recoup
their research and development (R&D) costs and capture the
returns from their innovations. To help students understand
these issues and the complex nature of the patenting decisions,
an economic experiment was developed where the students
themselves were placed in the position of an innovating firm
and needed to decide how to best protect their innovations.
The use of an economic experiment provides a more complete
way of teaching students patenting decisions, due to the limited
usefulness of patent data. Specifically, with patent data one can
only observe the ex-post decisions (i.e., whether the innovation
has been patented or not; licensed or not; whether a trial has
taken place or not) and thus, it is difficult to analyze the actual
decision-making process. The experiment developed allows for
analysis of the decision making process without such problems.
Furthermore, the design has the additional benefits of emphasizing
the profit-maximizing goal of firms and providing lessons on risk
and uncertainty. 
The experiment was designed for use in two upper level
courses: a course on the economics of technology and a course in
agribusiness management. Typical enrollment for these courses is
from 20 to 45 students, primarily juniors and seniors. The
experiment would be appropriate for any course where patent or
other intellectual property rights (IPR) issues are discussed. Courses
where decisions under risk and uncertainty are explained, such as
intermediate micro, could also be considered. In these, discussion of
patent issues could be minimized and the experiment could be
viewed primarily as a lesson in risk, with some context to increase
student interest. For the primary application where patents are the
focus, basic information is given prior to the experiment. The major
issues covered are the requirements for patents, the reasons the
government is willing to grant them, and what the innovator and
society gain from them. This discussion sufficiently prepares
students for understanding the upcoming experiment. Instructions
are given to students during the previous class to allow them time to
further consider the issues and plan their strategy. A key issue with
experiments is the incentive. This experiment has been run using
extra credit points, usually for the next exam, based on student
earnings.
The experiment consists of 20 periods, each representing one
year a patent would be in effect, and places each student in the role
of a firm or innovator that has developed a novel product. The first
decision they need to make is whether or not to patent their
innovation or keep it a trade secret. Their next decision would be the
scope of the patent: narrow or broad. During each period there is a
probability that the innovation will be reverse engineered, as in the
trade secret case, or that the patent will be infringed upon. In the
case of infringement, students who choose the patenting option have
to further choose whether to legally defend their patent by invoking
an infringement trial. Once students indicate their decision in the
corresponding box on their record sheets it can not be changed. The
probabilities for all possible events each period are selected based
on a combination of estimated actual likelihoods and numbers that
would allow the comparisons to be relatively straightforward for the
students (see Table 1).  The experiment was designed so that the1
most profitable choice would be the broad patent, followed by the
narrow patent, with the trade secret being the least profitable choice
(see Tables 1 and 2). 
At the conclusion of the experiment a short survey is handed
out. The purpose of the survey is to encourage students to think
about and justify their decisions. It also gives them an opportunity
to “change their mind,” by explaining how they might choose
differently if given the chance. These can be used during the post-
experiment discussion or could be handed in for the instructor to
summarize.
For each period where a final outcome hasn’t been reached or until twenty periods1
have passed, the student draws a poker chip from a bag designed for the probabilities
they face (a full set includes five bags representing all the possible probabilities
needed: Trade Secret, Narrow Patent, Broad Patent, Narrow Court Case and Broad
Court Case). For example, a student who chose trade secrecy as a means of
protecting their innovation would draw from a bag with seven white chips and three
red chips (representing the 30 percent chance their innovation will be reverse-
engineered) until they drew a red chip or they had drawn 20 times.
Table 1. Summary of Probabilities Used in Experiment
Protection         
     Selected Event Probability
Trade Secret
Reverse Engineered 30%
Narrow Patent
Infringed 10%
Court Invalidates Patent 20%
Broad Patent
Infringed 40%
Court Invalidates Patent 50%
Students found the ranking of some of the strategies in
terms of their profitability harder than others, as is evident
from the combined results of running four sessions of the
experiment in classes in 2006 (presented in Table 3 on next
page). Most students (89%) chose the more profitable strategy
of patenting their innovation, to the inferior strategy of keeping
it a trade secret (11%). However, those that chose the
patenting option had trouble determining the optimal breadth
of their patent, with more than half the students choosing the
narrow patent option (53.5%) to the more profitable broad
patent option (46.5%). On the other hand, the vast majority
chose to invoke a trial under infringement (98 percent of those
that chose a narrow patent and 100 percent of those that chose
a broad patent), which, given the assigned cost, return and
probability values, clearly dominated the option to not legally
defend the patent. 
Interestingly, most students came to understand the correct
ranking of the strategies through their participation in the
experiment, despite the fact that they might not have known
the exact differences in the profitability of the various
outcomes. This became evident when students were asked
immediately after the experiment whether or not they would
choose a different strategy if they were given the opportunity
to participate in the experiment again, and why. These
percentage results are also reported in Table 3. Specifically,
the majority of those who had chosen trade secrecy stated that
they would patent (78%) with less than 17 percent of these
stating they would choose a narrow patent, and over 83 percent
stating they would choose a broad patent. This indicated that
the experiment was highly effective in helping students better
identify the optimal strategy. No student that selected a patent
indicated a desire to switch to trade secrecy. The fewest
students wanting to change were in the optimal strategy
category of the broad patent.
It is also common to have students who understood that
the broad patent choice had the highest expected value, select
a narrow patent instead. This is very useful for guiding the
class into a more detailed discussion of risk and uncertainty
using the patent choice as context. This helps show that there
is more to an innovator’s decision, and that differences in risk
tolerance levels can affect decisions. In past experience, some
students will even self-identify themselves as risk-averse and
consider the uncertainty aspect crucial in their patent selection.
At the time the experiments were run, the government was
considering the Patent Reform Act of 2007. The bill proposed
several important changes, with the ones most relevant to the experiment being changes in how damage awards are calculated in
infringement cases, and streamlining the process for challenging patents. As an assignment, students could be asked to write up their
recommendations for how they would address the issues and concerns of the current patent system. Having been in the place of an innovator
will give them an extra level of insight into the debate that would not otherwise have been possible.
Note:   This article is based on the article “Understanding Patenting Decisions: A Classroom Experiment” by John Bernard and Amalia
Yiannaka, currently under review in the Journal of Economic Education. 
Amalia (Emie) Yiannaka, (402) 472-2047
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Agricultural Economics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
yiannaka2@unl.edu
Table 2. Summary of Costs and Returns Used in Experiment
Protection Selected
Costs/Returns Trade Secret Narrow Patent Broad Patent
Patenting Cost  NA $100,000 $100,000
Infringement Trial Costs NA $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Returns if not reversed engineered, not infringed or trial is won
under infringement
$1,000,000/period $1,000,000/period $2,000,000/period
Returns if reversed engineered, infringed and no trial or trial is 
lost under infringement
$100,000/period $100,000/period $100,000/period
Damages awarded when trial is won NA $900,000 $1,900,000
Table 3. Summary of Results of Experiment Sessions for Students in 2006/07
Students
Average Period
Infringed1
Percent
Invoking Trial
Percent That
Would Change
Percent Change to:2
Choice Number Percent Narrow Broad
Trade Secret 14 11.11 3.54 na 78.57 16.67 83.33
Narrow Patent 60 47.62 8.23 98.33 20.00 na 100.00
Broad Patent 52 41.27 2.42 100.00 15.38 100.00 na
Infringed or reverse-engineered, as appropriate.1  
No students wanted to change to trade secrets.2  
